The “inconsistent tetrad” refers to the four propositions ‎commonly used in the philosophy of mind to address the issue of the mind-‎body relation. As the name suggests, although each of these propositions may ‎individually be true, only three of them can be true at the same time, while one ‎must always be false. For instance: 1) The soul is a non-material substance; 2) ‎The body is a material substance; 3) The soul and body are in relation to each ‎other; 4) The relationship between material and non-material entities is ‎impossible. Throughout the history of philosophy, different philosophers have ‎provided various solutions to this problem. Dualists, who believe in the non-‎material nature of the soul, reject the fourth proposition, which denies the ‎possibility of the relationship between material and non-material entities. In ‎contrast, proponents of physicalist theories attempt to resolve the issue by ‎materializing the soul.‎

This paper attempts to analyze the inconsistent tetrad from the ‎perspective of the 17th-century Safavid philosopher Sadr al-Din Shirazi. After ‎explaining the nature of the inconsistent tetrad, the paper discusses Shirazi’s ‎concept of the soul. It then examines which propositions, from the perspective ‎of his theory of the soul, are likely to be true and which are likely to be false. ‎The conclusion emphasizes that, according to Shirazi’s theory of the soul, ‎which is “corporeal in its origination, but spiritual in subsistence,” the soul and ‎body represent the only ontological unity that evolves from matter to spirit. ‎Unlike the dualist or physicalist viewpoints, the Shirazi perspective offers not ‎a singular solution, but multiple possible solutions to this problem.‎